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TRACES OF VIOLENCE: GADAMER, HABERMAS, AND THE
HATE SPEECH PROBLEM
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of ways to approach the published works of
Gadamer and Habermas. One can, for example, attempt a careful
exegesis of a particular text. This Article, however, will be of a much
more opportunistic character. We will herein scavenge the work of
Gadamer and Habermas in hopes of making progress on a problem
that, admittedly, neither writer has specifically addressed. In
particular, we will seek to make progress on understanding the hate
speech problem, at its most legally fundamental levels.
We must justify the choice of the hate speech problem as our
focus, as well as the choice of Gadamer and Habermas as sources of
potential inspiration. Of course, our chosen approach must be judged
ultimately by its fruitfulness, or lack thereof. But a few elements of a
preliminary justification can be offered at the outset. Over the past
two decades or so, a great deal of passion and intellectual energy has
been devoted to one aspect or another of the possibility of regulating
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foray into hate speech law, see chapter 3 in R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE
SPEECH LAW 57-93 (1990). The author wishes to thank Professor Jay Mootz.
1. We refer herein to "the hate speech problem" solely for convenience. There is
admittedly no consensually recognized, monolithic hate speech problem. In fact, the hate
speech problem is multiple, taking on different dimensions in diverse legal and social contexts.
We will attempt to make such progress as we can without claiming to address all such contexts.
For a sense of some of the commonalities and complexities, see generally RICHARD DELGADO
& JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE
NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); THE PRICE WE
PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura
J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995). Much of our focus will be narrowly on the use of
racial epithets in one context or another, but the use of racial epithets hardly exhausts the scope
of racist speech in a broader sense. For a useful narrow definition, tying hate speech to insulting
epithets, see Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 71, 71 (1996). Generally, such a narrow definition will suffice for our
purposes herein.
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hate speech.2 The hate speech problem is, at least for the typical
victims of hate speech, of practical importance. 3 But of late, progress
in understanding and theoretically resolving the hate speech problem
has stalled. The commentators have arrayed themselves along a
broad continuum of responses, in an apparently stable, unproductive
fashion.4 Under these circumstances, any indirect assistance with the
hate speech problem from whatever source is to be welcomed.
The choice of Gadamer and Habermas as sources of potential
inspiration makes some preliminary, general sense. Each has, after
all, done his share of careful reflection, over a period of time, on the
use of language, and on language in the law.5 There seems no tenet or
principle within their work that delegitimizes our enterprise from the
start. Habermas in particular has developed the Austinian distinction
2. Consider, for example, the grass roots efforts upon which judicial judgment was
eventually passed in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (addressing, respectively,
two city ordinances and three public university antidiscrimination codes).
3. Consider, as an example deliberately chosen for its atypicality, the personal experience
recounted by the philosopher Wojciech Sadurski as a recent Polish immigrant to Australia.
Sadurski reports that he attended, out of civic devotion, a local town council meeting at which
one speaker made anti-immigrant, and, in particular, anti-Polish remarks, raising questions of
child safety and town cleanliness standards. Sadurski then reports that
[Slince the day I have heard the speech, my life has clearly been transformed for the
worse. Whenever I meet my neighbours, fellow workers, or salespersons in the shops,
I search for expressions of dislike or contempt in their eyes. When they are rude, I
attribute it to their hatred of Poles. When they are polite, I treat it as a symptom of
their patronising attitude .... [M]y relationship with others can no longer be
normal .... I am upset, distressed, angry and deeply offended.
Wojciech Sadurski, Offending with Impunity: Racial Vilification and Freedom of Speech, 14
SYDNEY L. REV. 163, 186 (1992). We should note in particular that the speech in this case
apparently had more substantive, cognitive locutionary content than many instances of hate
speech, and that Professor Sadurski is not, all things considered, a devotee of hate speech
legislation. See id. at 193 ("Racists are there, and it is better to let them air their views in the
open rather than allow an illusion to grow that the problem has been solved because racist
statements have been made illegal.").
4. See, e.g., the gradations among academic responses to the relation between workplace
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2
(1994), and the Free Speech Clause surveyed in Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in
the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REV. 687, 692-93
(1997). Of course, there could arise a detailed and definitive future U.S. Supreme Court
opinion on possible free speech limits on Title VII, but it seems fair to say that further Supreme
Court opinions on hate speech would not guarantee political, intellectual, or even legal closure
on crucial hate speech issues.
5. While particularized citations will be forthcoming below, Gadamer's magnum opus is
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., Continuum Publ'g 1994) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. A
number of Habermas's works take up these broad themes. Among them, and one of the most
recent, is JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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between the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of speech 6 in
ways that track some standard discussions of the effects of hate
speech.7 Hate speech practically begs for reference to or comparison
with Habermas's theory of communicative action,8 and in particular
for contrast with his ideal speech situation.9
Gadamer, on the other hand, is especially attuned to relating
language, and the meaning and effects of language, to history and
traditions,10 presumably not excluding traditions of verbal and other
forms of racism. Gadamer is hardly inclined to argue that we should
merely understand, and not apply, his theoretical work in our own
contexts. For Gadamer, after all, understanding and application are
inseparable; understanding is always already application."
Our general method, which bears certain affinities to the activity
described as bricolage,'12 may prove worthwhile if we can steer a
course between two obstructions. First, we must avoid the mistake of
excessive fastidiousness in reading and interpreting Gadamer and
Habermas. There is certainly every chance that neither would
endorse any, let alone all, of what we may wind up saying about hate
speech. The conclusions we draw about hate speech will thus not be
rigorously, deductively inferable from the work of Gadamer and
Habermas. But Gadamer would be unlikely to argue that his own
subjective authorial intentions, at any point, must confine the
6. See, e.g., 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 288-90
(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981).
7. See Andrew Altman, Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical
Examination, 103 ETHICS 302, 309 (1993) (citing J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH
WORDS 98 (1962)).
8. See generally 1 HABERMAS, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., the account in JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION:
REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 49-56 (Ciaran Cronin trans., MIT Press 1993) (1990).
10. These are major themes of the Gadamer corpus, including GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., id. at 308-11; David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and
Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 139 (1985) (noting that for Gadamer,
"interpretation is always already application"); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Practice, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 575, 595 n.89 (1990) (reviewing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN
AMERICA (1989)) (Gadamer as holding that "application is a necessary component of
understanding"); Georgia Warnke, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 395, 396 (1997) (commenting that for Gadamer, "understanding, interpretation, and
application of meaning all define the same process").
12. See, following Claude Levi-Strauss, J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive
Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1487 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); Mark
Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 909, 931 (1996) (citing CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 17 (1966)).
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understanding and application of his texts. 3 Our conclusions can
stand or fall on their own, without the implied endorsement of
Gadamer and Habermas. We are, again, looking merely for
inspiration, for a clearer image, or for a better turn of phrase, not for
a logical premise implying a theoretical solution to the hate speech
problem.
The other sort of mistake is the opposite of the first. We must
avoid simply dressing up our own pre-selected insights into the hate
speech problem in the distinguished regalia of Gadamer and
Habermas, without gaining at least a broader, clearer, or deeper
understanding. In such a case, all that is genuinely interesting and
distinctive about Gadamer and Habermas plays no real functional
role. Such alleged insights may, in the extreme, not in fact be
particularly insightful, and neither influenced by nor worthy of
association with the names of Gadamer and Habermas. The essayist
Montaigne, we may point out, was complaining of a related practice
when he objected to the learned who "quote Plato and Saint Thomas
in matters where the first comer would make as good a witness. ' '14
We should instead seek to learn what Gadamer and Habermas in
particular, and not necessarily any observer of the passing scene, can
teach us.
I. SELECTIONS FROM THE AMERICAN HATE SPEECH CASE LAW:
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
For the sake of analytical clarity and simplicity, let us focus our
attention on the admittedly distinctive case of the use of racial
epithets and related racial slurs and invective. The use of racial
epithets and their status in relation to the First Amendment have
been judicially addressed in a number of legal contexts. Epithet
speech has, for example, come into legal conflict with equal
protection claims,15 section 1983 civil rights claims, 6 municipal law
13. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 292; Francis J. Mootz III,
The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work
of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 523, 533 (1988); Brad Sherman,
Hermeneutics in Law, 51 MOD. L. REV. 386, 391 (1988).
14. THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 624 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1999).
We hold today that an officer's use of a racial epithet, without harassment or some
other conduct that deprives the victim of established rights, does not amount to an
equal protection violation.... Where the conduct at issue consists solely of speech,
there is no equal protection violation.... We cannot conclude that his alleged conduct
[one isolated comment] therefore rises to the level of harassment.
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enforcement and firefighter discipline regulations," public university
employee discipline policies, 8 the common law tort of intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress,19 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.20
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See, e.g., Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 514 (6th Cir. 1991). The court there noted that defendant's "remark
was made by a decisionmaker and cannot be construed as a joke. His use of the [racial epithet]
cannot be characterized as harmless or casual.... [T]he use of this word, even in jest, could be
evidence of racial antipathy." Id.
17. See, e.g., Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706, 715 (N.J. 1998) (holding that a
particular use of a particular racial slur in a particular context "was not remotely related to any
matter of public concern" [under the test from the Pickering case] and that "the City's interest
in maintaining order, discipline, harmony, and a professional working relationship ...
substantially outweighs Karins's right to make abusive, insulting racially motivated comments").
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Focusing
on the 'content, form and context' of Dambrot's use of the [racial epithet] [under the test from
the Connick case], this Court can find nothing 'relating to any matter of political, social or other
concern to the community.' Dambrot's locker room speech imparted no socially or politically
relevant message to his players.").
19. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 696 (N.J. 1998). The court in Taylor
recognized that "[miost people [today know] that certain words are offensive and only
calculated to wound." Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 145 (1982) (altera-
tions made to conform quote to original)). However, the court proceeded to note that "[a]
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress also requires that 'the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff must be so severe that no reasonable [person] could be
expected to endure it."' Taylor, 706 A.2d at 696 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund
Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)); see also Wigginton v. Servidio, 734 A.2d 798, 807 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1999).
While "a single racial slur uttered by a 'stranger on the street' could not amount to
extreme and outrageous conduct [for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort] ... courts have recognized that employees are entitled to greater protection from
insults than strangers and that employers have a higher duty than strangers to avoid
inflicting emotional distress.... The employer's position of authority and power over
the plaintiff and the abuse of the employer-employee relationship can both contribute
to a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Id. (citation omitted). For further discussion, see, for example, Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468
P.2d 216, 219 n.4 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) ("Nor can we accept defendants' contention that
plaintiff, as a truckdriver must have become accustomed to such abusive language."); Contreras
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (discussing the legal
sufficiency of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim for employer's failure to
control employees' derogatory ethnic remarks toward fellow employee).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). The Supreme Court
has, for example, recently reiterated that the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet
which engenders offensive [sic] feelings in an employee would not sufficiently alter terms and
conditions of employment to violate Title VII." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
787 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). But see the description of Professor
Sadurski's non-workplace experience, supra note 3. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,
23 (1993) (apparently distinguishing crucially, for Title VII purposes, between workplace
discriminatory conduct that is "humiliating" as opposed to a "mere offensive utterance"). The
Court in Harris concluded that the "mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee ... does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to
implicate Title VII." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotations omitted). This sort of flat,
broad determination begs for reconsideration, despite its legal support in cases such as Taylor,
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Of course, the real import, if not the denotative meaning, of a
racial epithet may vary depending upon factors such as the racial
identities of the speaker and audience, the personal and relative
power relationships among the parties, the social context and tone of
the conversation, the speaker's intentions, and any listener
expectations. 21 Any real understanding of epithet speech must take
such considerations into proper account.
The subtleties and complications of such speech should not,
however, mislead us into thinking that racial epithet speech is
essentially like most other forms of speech. As one court has
observed with regard to a particularly virulent racial epithet, "[t]he
use of the word ... automatically separates the person addressed
from every non-black person; this is discrimination per se. '22 The
typical speaker of a racial epithet cannot entirely denature that
epithet through tone of voice, facial expression, mood setting, or even
express disclaimers. No speaker can thereby so easily set aside major
themes of American legal and cultural history.
It has thus been argued that "[t]here are certain words and
phrases 'that in the context of history carry a clear message of...
hatred, persecution, and degradation of certain groups.' ' 23 Racial
706 A.2d at 690, and Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding two racial
slurs to be insufficiently severe in the absence of "a barrage of opprobrious comments")
(internal quotations omitted). The Taylor court recognized, however, that "[t]he connotation of
the epithet itself can materially contribute to the remark's severity. Racial epithets are regarded
as especially egregious and capable of engendering a severe impact." 706 A.2d at 690. These
tensions and inconsistencies suggest that the courts do not have a clear understanding of how to
legally handle severe epithet cases, partly because they do not consistently understand how
language works within an ongoing historical culture. In Title VII cases, the judicial attitude
ranges broadly in assessing the relevance and weight of recourse to epithets. For some, "mere"
offensive utterances are distinguished from more serious forms of discrimination or harassment.
See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 114 n.l (3d Cir. 1999) (considering
mere offensive utterance as one of a dozen possible factors in hostile work environment claims).
More realistically, it has also been recognized, in contrast, that "[plerhaps no single act can
more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment' ... than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet ... by a supervisor in the
presence of his subordinates." Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). There is an
arguable difference between at least some cases of casual, joking, egalitarian, nonauthoritative,
comradely use of an epithet solely among members of the ethnic group, and even a single
epithet used in earnest by a supervisor toward a work subordinate. See, e.g., Dambrot, 55 F.3d
at 1180, 1187; Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675. Epithets do vary in their tone and import depending
upon the identities of the speakers, audience, and context. See, e.g., the circumstances discussed
in Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1180, 1187.
21. See supra note 20.
22. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. I11. 1984).
23. Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706, 720 (N.J. 1998) (quoting State v. Vawter,
642 A.2d 349, 354 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2365 (1989))).
[Vol. 76:991
TRACES OF VIOLENCE
epithet speech therein differs from some other forms of hostile
speech: "'[r]acial insults are different qualitatively because they
conjure up the entire history of racial discrimination in this
country.' ' 24 We shall briefly discuss belowzs the relationship between
this inevitable verbal "conjuring up" of an entire historical tradition
and the logic of freedom of speech.
The cases have given us this and much else to think about. It
seems plain enough that threats of violence based on racial identity
can impair, rather than promote, genuine free speech in the sense of
an uninhibited exchange of ideas.26 Can we then go on to say that
racial epithets undermine, or fail to contribute to, the robust
exchange of social ideas, even where no explicit threat of violence is
issued? Should such epithets be classified as contributions, or even
attempts to contribute, to any ongoing public discussion? What is
their value for free speech purposes, against which we might weigh
any harassing or discriminatory tendencies such speech might carry?
Do racial epithets constitute speech on a matter of public interest or
concern, against which we might balance any countervailing public
interests? Are there senses in which racial and other epithets send,
expressly or impliedly, a constitutionally relevant message? Do racial
epithets always or ever carry social messages independent of their
propensity to wound? In what ways, if any, is it legitimate for courts
or legislatures to judge the constitutional free speech value of the
language of such epithets? Are there any appropriate grounds for
legally restricting epithet speech that do not simply reflect
disagreement with the speech's content or point of view?
II. SOME RESPONSES FROM THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
Hate speech obviously implicates, in one way or another, values
such as freedom, equality, and dignity. 27 The academic commentators
on hate speech often differ as to possible conflicts among these
24. Taylor, 706 A.2d at 695 (quoting Delgado, supra note 19, at 157); see also Williams v.
Tri-County Metro. Trans. Dist., 958 P.2d 202, 205 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Delgado, supra
note 19, at 157). This is certainly not to suggest that no other category of speech other than a
racial epithet could summon a historical theme in its entirety, but racial epithets may in this
regard differ from many forms of generally hostile speech.
25. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 226 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) ("Experience shows
that threats of violence based on personal characteristics or group identity cause deep individual
and societal harm and that they diminish, rather than enhance, the exchange of ideas in a free
society.") (internal quotation omitted).
27. See generally Delgado, supra note 19.
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values.28 It is even possible to argue that these values actually do not
conflict in the hate speech context, and that they all point
unequivocally in favor of either restricting hate speech, or not
restricting hate speech. In any event, it is fair to say that the academic
commentators often end up focusing largely on the consequences of
hate speech.29
To begin with, racial epithets often convey, if only implicitly or
via some sort of cultural shorthand, "the message that distinctions of
race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and personhood."30
Verbal responses to such epithets, the classic "more speech"3
remedy, are commonly futile, irrelevant, dangerous, or impossible.3 2
Crucially, racial insults are typically "not intended to inform or
convince the listener."33 As Professor Richard Delgado concisely puts
the point, "Racial insults invite no discourse. 3 4  Racial insults that
neither seek to inform, nor to invite any responsive discourse, are not,
however, without their evocative associations. Such insults, as we
have seen, "conjure up the entire history of racial discrimination in
this country."35  As Professor Charles Lawrence reports, no such
28. Compare, e.g., Delgado, supra note 19, and Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, with Alexander, supra note
1, at 73 ("[P]aradigmatic hate speech, if harmful, is harmful only in ways that cannot justify its
prohibition without gutting our constitutional conception of freedom of speech."). See also
Dana Moon Dorsett, Hate Speech Debate and Free Expression, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259
(1997); Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103 (1992); Sadurski, supra note 3. See in particular the
pointed debate between Professors Delgado and Gey in Steven G. Gey, The Case Against
Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1996); Richard Delgado, Are Hate-
Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy?: A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1998);
Steven G. Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard Delgado, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1077 (1998) [hereinafter Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited].
29. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 19, at 135-47.
30. Id. at 136.
31. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled on other grounds by, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
32. See Delgado, supra note 19, at 146.
33. Id. at 177; see also Delgado, supra note 28, at 872; Kent Greenawalt, Insults and
Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 293 (1990) (An epithet speaker
"does not use words to inform, nor is he really attempting to indicate his feelings. His aim is to
wound...."); Kenneth D. Ward, Free Speech and the Development of Liberal Virtues: An
Examination of the Controversies Involving Flag-Burning and Hate Speech, 52 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 733, 768 (1998) (discussing hate speakers as expressing "no interest in participating in
discussion" or deliberation, and as neither engaging with audience ideas nor seeking any
response, as opposed to silence or intimidation). Professor Peter Byrne defines racial insults
precisely to exclude "rational but offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and
evidence." J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J.
399, 400 (1991).
34. Delgado, supra note 19, at 177.
35. Id. at 157. Thus the effects of epithets directed at different target groups will vary in
nature and intensity, depending upon the varying histories of discrimination against the groups
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verbal racial incident is truly "isolated,"36 and any such use of racial
epithets may "evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons
regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed. 37
It is thus a mistake to include typical epithet speech within the
classic free speech paradigm of an exchange of popular, or unpopular,
social ideas38 aimed at informing or persuading, immediately or over
time, at least some portion of one's audience. Epithet speech may
well have other functions not only different from, but entirely
incompatible with, the familiar exchange of social ideas paradigm.
We must thus be alert to what epithet speech actually does, and to its
actual role within lived human experience.39 Epithet speech has
understandably been said to partake more of action than of
expression. 40 Professor Kent Greenawalt thus refers to at least some
epithet speech as, to a degree, "situation-altering," 41 as opposed to
purely expressive. 42 The intention behind such speech may thus be to
wound, 43 humiliate," or otherwise inflict pain rather than to
communicate a social idea in any classically discursive sense. 45
Speech thus may have a number of different kinds of functions
and effects. Some writers have sought to distinguish between the
illocutionary effects and the perlocutionary effects of speech. 46
Illocutionary effects are, roughly, those that are accomplished in the
very act of uttering the words in a certain context or with a certain
intent, as in the case of making a promise, being deputized, or issuing
in question. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the
Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 81 (1994).
36. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 461.
37. Id.
38. See Massey, supra note 28, at 194.
39. See Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 287-88. Compare Wittgenstein's famous emphasis on
language as it is actually used in the world. See LUDWIG WiTTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 48e § 116 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Prentice Hall 3d ed. 1958) (1953).
40. See Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 290-93.
41. See id. at 290, 292. There is probably a sense, though, in which all instances of
(understood or even misunderstood) speech are "situation-altering," or are at least situation"altering" in the broad sense of tending either to somehow alter or else preserve a situation.
Any ordinary conversation tends at a minimum to reinforce our previous assessment of our
interlocutor's worthiness or competencies.
42. See id. at 290.
43. See Delgado, supra note 19.
44. See Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 293.
45. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473,
480 (1997) ("The marketplace of ideas.., does not justify protecting expression that is intended
merely to injure and not to contribute to truth .... ).
46. This distinction is traceable to AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 95-108.
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a threat.47 Perlocutionary effects are said to be those accomplished by
means of one's speech, through a causal effect on one's audience, as
in the case of speech that induces audience reliance, trust, fright, or
anger.48
This distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects
may not be strict, or even terribly viable.49 If hate speech evokes or
conjures up a racist tradition, 50 should we say, for example, that such a
result is an illocutionary, or else a perlocutionary, effect of the
speech? Either answer is defensible. Even if the distinction is thus
not clear, however, the very idea that speech may have effects that do
not depend upon, or are not limited to, the agreement or
disagreement of any listener with the propositional content of the
speech may help us to better understand the nature of hate speech."
It is certainly not difficult to think of examples of racist speech
with clear and undeniable illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. The
drive-by hurling of a racial epithet at a lone pedestrian may, as we
have seen, evoke or conjure up an historical tradition,52 at least some
of which will take the form of illocutionary or perlocutionary effects.
We should not, however, discount the illocutionary or perlocutionary
effects of even refined, technical, and abstract discussions of race.
In our culture, for example, even the theoretical discussion of
race and alleged native general intelligence53 inevitably involves
important illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. Some of these
effects may be unintended, or even unrecognized. They may vary in
47. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 850 n.87 (1996) (reviewing NAOMI W.
COHEN, JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (1992) and
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995)).
48. See id.; Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First
Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 431 n.49 (1987). While the focus is normally on those
perlocutionary effects that depend upon an understood message, or on the content of the
speech, speech can have perlocutionary effects apart from any understood content, as in the
case of someone who is frightened or alerted by the mere sound of a voice.
49. Cf. Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 199,
199 (1996) (referring to the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects as
"tricky, and not always stable").
50. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
51. For relevant discussion, see, for example, Alexander, supra note 1, at 87-89 (discussing
Altman, supra note 7); Altman, supra note 7, at 309-10; Butler, supra note 49, at 199, 202.
52. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). For a sense of some of the
responsive discussion, see, for example, THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995).
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intensity and direction. But we should recognize that such a dis-
cussion, however apparently abstract and detached, may have effects
such as (yet again) putting entire groups of people under special
scrutiny, casting suspicion, putting such groups on the defensive, or
even reinforcing traditional stereotypes, quite apart from the merits
of any scientific argument or of anyone's agreement or disagreement
therewith. The illocutionary or perlocutionary effects of such speech
may, at least in some given cases, far outweigh, in their social
significance, any effect that is mediated by agreement or disagree-
ment with such speech.14
In general and in various particular contexts," though, the
academic commentary on the hate speech problem remains badly
fractured.16  Those particularly critical of legal restrictions on hate
speech emphasize concerns regarding slippery slopes and dangerous
precedents,57 backfiring intentions, 8 administrative incompetence and
unpredictability, 9 the risks of superficially repressing racism,6° and
54. This possibility seems underdiscussed in, for example, Alexander, supra note 1, at 87-
89, and Altman, supra note 7, at 309-10.
55. See the disparate commentary on free speech issues in the context of workplace Title
VII hostile environment actions as discussed in, for example, Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII As
Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481
(1991); Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 579 (1995); Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment As
Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997); Estlund, supra note 4;
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog
That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 1; David B. Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassment and
the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor Volokh, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321 (1996);
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and
the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); Eugene Volokh,
Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305 (1996); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work
Environment" Harassment Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
56. See, e.g., supra note 28.
57. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 93 ("[A] ban on 'epithets' will shade naturally into
a ban on the ideas of subhuman, contemptible status that epithets express."); Gey, Postmodern
Censorship Revisited, supra note 28, at 1082-84 ("Once the postmodern censors sweep away
strict restrictions on the regulation of antisocial expression, they will have little protection when
political activists with whom they sympathize have their own speech declared antisocial.");
Sadurski, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the possibility of hate speech legislation's being used
to silence the disadvantaged).
58. See, e.g., supra note 57; see also Alexander, supra note 1, at 93 ("[I]f a list of specific
words is banned, undoubtedly new words will begin functioning as epithets.").
59. See Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309,
1321 (1997) (questioning "whether the interventions of admittedly non-ideal governments can
systematically be expected to be more harmful to the truth-finding process than the distortions
occasioned by the operation of equally non-ideal inequalities and other misuses of
communicative power in the deliberative setting").
60. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 79 ("[B]anning hate speech often leaves the
hateful attitudes and beliefs intact and just creates the illusion that they have disappeared.");
Dorsett, supra note 28, at 292 ("Critical race theorists, while emphasizing the harms of racist
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discrimination among different forms of racist speech or different
classes of racist speakers.6 Those more sympathetic to restrictions on
hate speech, correspondingly, reject or minimize the likelihood or the
moral weight of such concerns, perhaps in light of differing value
priorities.62 Below, we shall draw upon the work of Gadamer and
Habermas to clarify and reinforce certain themes and to minimize or
bypass others, with an eye toward theoretical progress on the hate
speech problem.
III. GADAMER AND THE NATURE AND STATUS OF HATE SPEECH
Let us admit that there is something odd about turning to Hans-
Georg Gadamer for understanding of hate speech. It is vaguely like
turning to Gandhi for insight into hate itself. We might well say that
if there is any sort of discourse that is the diametric opposite of hate
speech, it is embodied in Gadamer's work, as in, to choose merely
one example, his approach to the basic Aristotelian texts.63 At the
very least, though, perhaps we can learn or more vividly appreciate
something about hate speech through this especially stark contrast.
Beyond Gadamer's sheer exemplariness, though, we can more fully
appreciate the real nature and status of hate speech through some of
Gadamer's central concerns, including for tradition and the so-called
"history of effect," and for one's approach to one's own prejudices in
genuinely fruitful interchange and understanding. 64
Gadamer can, for example, offer some perspective on the
unusual nature of the most virulent racial epithets. It has been rightly
observed that often, such epithets do not themselves literally convey
any intended general social idea,65 and are certainly no essential part
speech, ignore the potential harm of inflamed repressed racism."); Sadurski, supra note 3, at
193.
61. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 78 ("Banning epithets, but not skillful rhetorical
skewerings, would essentially and unjustifiably discriminate against low-brow forms of
expression."); see also id. at 92. We would of course want to investigate whether the various
psychological and other effects of crude and refined or subtle racist speech might significantly
differ.
62. See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 1.
63. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN PLATONIC-
ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY (P. Christopher Smith trans., 1986) [hereinafter GADAMER, IDEA
OF THE GOOD].
64. While these concerns run throughout the Gadamerian corpus in general, the central
single focus would be Truth and Method. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5. For
more on the dualistic, necessary, and constructive, yet limiting nature of Gadamerian prejudice,
see Graeme Nicholson, Truth in Metaphysics and in Hermeneutics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HANS-GEORG GADAMER 309, 317 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 1997).
65. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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of any exposition of intended general social ideas. 66 How can we best
account, then, for the sometimes psychologically devastating effects
of such epithets, typically in accordance with the speaker's
intentions?67  How can epithet speech in some sense not itself
articulate any social idea, and yet in another sense somehow convey
enough meaning to foreseeably pack a psychological punch?
It seems justifiable to think of this important duality of epithet
speech in Gadamerian terms. Gadamer's work helps us appreciate
how hate speech that is in a legally important sense ideationally
barren can evoke or conjure up an entire racist historical tradition. 68
Gadamer explores with unusual acuity how "history affects and
indeed effects consciousness. '69 The hurling of a racial epithet is not
an isolated event.7 0 It is in a sense a discrete verbal act,71 but it is as
much an act in history as the recounted story of a lynching, or the
actual lynching itself, or all lynchings collectively. Gadamer clarifies
for us how "every event is effected by history, '72 how it inescapably
has its own pre-history, 73 and how it "does not appear ex nihilo. ' 74
Typically, the target of a racial epithet does not react psychologically
to such an epithet as though its use were historically contextless. 75
The epithet itself has a history, which helps explain why racists cannot
just immediately mint new, but equally effective racial epithets, just to
keep one step ahead of legal restrictions on traditional epithet speech.
Inexorably, both the epithet speaker and target are situated
within historical traditions.7 6  On Gadamer's understanding, our
traditions are multiple77 and are crucially verbal.78 There are certainly
66. This language is suggested by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
67. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 24, 35-37 and accompanying text.
69. JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND
METHOD 13 (1985).
70. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
72. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 199.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 276, 295. It has been
observed that "the operative force of tradition over interpretation is what Gadamer calls the
work of 'effective-history."' Sherman, supra note 13, at 390. This does not mean, however, that
we are simply trapped within our traditions, as flies in amber. Tradition evolves and is
determined through our participative exertions. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 5, at 293; Mootz, supra note 13, at 537.
77. See DAVID COUZENs HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY 197 (1994)
(interpreting Gadamer as holding not that tradition is unitary or homogeneous, but"multifarious," with the result that there are many and diverse operative traditions); Lawrence
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American cultural and legal traditions embodying some forms of
pluralism and racial egalitarianism, as reflected in the language of the
Declaration of Independence 79 and the Emancipation Proclamation. 80
But it must also be said that there are American traditions of
inegalitarianism, white supremacy, race baiting, and sheer racial
violence as well.81 To react to a racial epithet is, in a sense, to
recognize that the epithet is embedded in,82 and draws most if not all
of its real meaning from,83 an ongoing historical tradition.
Gadamer's work is equally useful in clarifying how radically hate
speech differs from any sort of attempt at genuine communication
and understanding. These radical differences help show why legally
restricting racial invective differs crucially from censoring the
communication of distasteful opinions or from attempts to persuade
an audience to adopt unpopular beliefs. Through Gadamer's work,
we can better appreciate why hate speech regulation need not
significantly impinge upon the communicative processes at the heart
of the First Amendment.
Gadamer argues that "[g]enuine speaking, which has something
to say and hence does not give prearranged signals, but rather seeks
words through which one reaches the other person, is the universal
human task."84 What Gadamer refers to here as "genuine speaking"
thus requires an attempt to "reach" an audience. Of course, an
epithet hurler doubtless "reaches" an audience in the crude sense of
Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54, 66 (1989) ("[O]ur pluralistic culture" is, per Gadamer,"constituted by a multiplicity of traditions.").
78. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 389 ("[T]radition is essentially
verbal in character.").
79. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating "that all men
are created equal").
80. See Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in NEAL H. COGAN,
CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 653, 654 (1999) ("[A]Il persons held as slaves.., shall be
then thenceforward, and forever free.").
81. See, for example, the discussion in Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 124-26 (1992) (briefly discussing the twentieth-century racial history of Forsyth
County). More broadly, see JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY: THE
GENERATION BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH (1994); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977).
82. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 296 ("[T]he text belongs to the
whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself.").
83. See id. at 300 (referring to the "history of effect" as "the reality and efficacy of history
within understanding itself").
84. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 17 (David E. Linge trans.,
1976).
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provoking an adverse, unwelcome emotional reaction, or of evoking
grisly historical traditions. Gadamer, however, refers to "reaching"
an audience in a rather different sense.
For Gadamer, any attempt at genuine understanding requires a
state of mind essentially antithetical to that of the epithet hurler.85 In
a genuine conversation, both interlocutors want to understand, 86 and
they seek a mutual,87  and perhaps mutually transformative, 88
understanding. Genuine conversation is a process that requires a
certain tentativeness and openness, 89 a mutual vulnerability, 9° and a
sense of the value of diverse perspectives91 in light of one's own
fallibility and limitations.9
85. For classic general discussion, see T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN
PERSONALITY (1969); GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (Anchor Books
1958) (1954); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW (George J. Becker trans., Schocken
Books 1948) (1946). This state of mind is in dramatic contrast with Gadamer's approach to
genuine conversation as requiring an attempt at mutual understanding, mutual openness,
mutual risk, mutual respect, mutual recognition, and a mutual sense of worthiness. See
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS,
AND PRAXIS 162 (1983).
86. See WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 209; Sherman, supra note 13, at 394.
87. See WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 209; Sherman, supra note 13, at 394. The idea of
mutuality may also be expressed as "give-and-take." See Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux:
Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 311,315 (1999).
88. See WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 209; Mootz, supra note 13, at 536; Sherman, supra
note 13, at 394; see also HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 110
(Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981) ("Discussion bears fruit when a common language is
found. Then the participants part from one another as changed beings. The individual
perspectives with which they entered upon the discussion have been transformed, and so they
are transformed themselves."). Again, there is certainly a depraved sense in which a racial slur
can promote a transformation, and perhaps even a transformation of both speaker and victim,
or of their relationship. This sort of transformation is, of course, not the product of any
cooperative endeavor, or of any genuinely open-minded search for unattained insights.
89. See, e.g., PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH 72 (1988) (characterizing Gadamerian
openness as a "listening stance"); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PRAISE OF THEORY: SPEECHES
AND ESSAYS 72 (Chris Dawson trans., Yale Univ. Press 1998) (1983) (discussing Gadamer on
the ability to recognize truth as itself requiring "an open mind"-as is presumably
uncharacteristic of the typical epithet hurler); Sherman, supra note 13, at 392-93 (requiring
openness to text and to other interlocutors); Georgia Warnke, Reply to Greenawalt, 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 437,439 (1997).
90. See GADAMER, supra note 88, at 100; cf. BERNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 144 ("It is
through the fusion of horizons that we risk and test our prejudices."); GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD, supra note 5, at 269 ("A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell
him something."); PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 76 (John B.
Thompson ed., 1981) (For Gadamer, "only insofar as I place myself in the other's point of view
do I confront myself with my present horizon, with my prejudices."); Sherman, supra note 13, at
392-93.
91. See, e.g., GADAMER, IDEA OF THE GOOD, supra note 63, at xxxi ("[AII the while
aiming to shed light on it from a variety of perspectives, but fully acknowledging that the
insights gained in this way will of necessity be inconclusive and unsystematic."); Michael J.
Perry, Constitutional Judgment As Moral Judgment: A Brief Comment, 61 U. COLO. L. REV.
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Of course, it is open to the epithet hurler to announce that he
does not care to thus put into play, or to put at risk, any of his most
virulent prejudices. He does not seek to inquire or to attain any
degree of genuine openness or mutual vulnerability. He is indifferent
to the hermeneutic task, or to what Gadamer refers to as "genuine
speaking." 93 He does not at all seek to understand, to persuade, or to
reach agreement. His purpose is more visceral. He seeks to use
words as a kind of club, or better, as a whip that leaves permanent
scars.
By way of response, we could, presumably, admit that the epithet
hurler and the Gadamerian hermeneuticist have very little overlap of
horizons, and that they are simply playing different language games.
What sense would it make, by way of analogy, to judge the gladiator
by the standards pertaining to the magician, or vice versa?
Ultimately, though, there is little justification for our constitutionally
deferring to the epithet hurler's inversion of and contempt for
Gadamerian values.
We need not protect the epithet hurler because the basic
purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause, whatever they are, need
not be construed as neutral as between him and the Gadamerian
inquirer. By way of loose analogy, we need not construct a theory of
maturity such that everyone who wants to be thought of as mature
turns out, on our theory, to be equally mature. This conclusion does
not concern anyone's ideological bias or bias against any attempt at
the articulate expression and coherent defense of disfavored ideas.
We certainly need not claim that Gadamer's account of hermeneutics
sets the minimum baseline for free speech protections. Such a
803, 807 (1990); Sherman, supra note 13, at 393 (arguing that a conversational partner must
grant the possible superiority of the other partner's position).
92. See GADAMER, IDEA OF THE GOOD, supra note 63, at xxxi ("We cannot ascertain an
indubitably secured starting point; we cannot know ahead of time where a philosophical
discussion will lead us, and we will never be able to say that we have arrived at a definitive
conclusion."); cf. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 69, at 166-67 (envisioning an inquiring interlocutor
as one who proposes an initial possibility, with an appreciation of the role of the unexpected,
and an openness to revision of some of one's initial prejudices). We should also note
Gadamer's concern to detect and remedy the social and other conditions that tend to block or
frustrate such egalitarian conversational inquiry. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 163. For
Habermas's general agreement on this point, see infra note 123.
93. See GADAMER, supra note 84, at 17. This does not imply that only Gadamer can lead
us to see these contrasts. Habermas in particular essentially follows Gadamer in this regard.
See HOY & MCCARTHY, supra note 77, at 188 ("Habermas acknowledges Gadamer's Truth and
Method as the source for Habermas's thesis that the telos of human language is reaching
understanding and agreement.").
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standard would, after all, amount to a baseline few speakers could
meet.
If there are, nevertheless, some basic purposes underlying the
Free Speech Clause-reasons why we typically wish to protect much
popular or unpopular verbal expression-there is no reason to
assume that any such reasons justify protection of hate speech. Those
purposes do not cohere as well with the nature and effects of epithet
spewing as with ordinary political discourse, however emotional or
intemperate, let alone as well as with the practice of an ideal
hermeneutic inquirer. Epithet speech may, on the most neutral
understanding, simply not cohere with the acknowledged purposes
underlying the Free Speech Clause.
We value free speech for its contributions, for example, to the
flourishing of rich personal and intellectual development, 94 to the
serious, dialogic exchange of ideas, of whatever stripe, bearing upon
the conduct of a representative democratic government,95 to the
earnest, ongoing pursuit of truth under conditions of inevitable
human fallibility,96 to teaching tolerance,9 7 or for other basic purposes.
Yet we may find little or no reason to bring the typical instance of
epithet hurling within the scope of Free Speech Clause coverage in
the first place. Gadamer's account of conversation, and even of
idealized hermeneutic inquiry, help us more fully appreciate this
concept.
In particular, unlike today's pessimists, we need not assume that
our racist and other unworthy traditions are frozen permanently and
94. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3 (1966); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
593 (1982). The classic, and still most valuably provocative, discussion of this rationale for free
speech remains JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975). See also Kent
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989); Brian C. Murchison,
Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998).
95. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 94, at 3; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1948); C. Edwin Baker, The Process of
Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982); Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
96. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 94, at 3; MILL, supra note 94, at 17-52; William P.
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth As a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV.
1 (1995); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (1987). For a discussion of Gadamer's intersubjective, rather than
classically objective, account of truth, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 615 (1990). See also GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD,
supra note 5, at 490 ("[T]here is... no understanding that is free of all prejudices, however
much the will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping their thrall.").
97. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); Vincent Blasi, The Teaching Function of the First
Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1987) (reviewing BOLLINGER, supra).
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unalterably into our culture. It is possible, for Gadamer, to confront
and alter such traditions and prejudices, rather than passively
accepting them as beyond legal redress. If epithet speech is typically
both intended and received in something of an assaultive or inflictive
fashion, loosely parallel to the use of a bullwhip, we should not be
startled to find that such speech is far removed from the Gadamerian
paradigm. Furthermore, such speech is excluded from even less
demanding paradigms and also falls outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. Gadamer's account of the hermeneutic
process certainly does not set the minimum standard for what should
count as protected speech. Rather, that account merely throws into
clearer relief, by way of contrast, the sorts of speech, independent of
any associated ideas, that do and do not fall within the purpose-
delimited scope of the Free Speech Clause.
IV. HABERMAS AND THE GULF BETWEEN IDEAL SPEECH AND
HATE SPEECH
Whatever divergences we may find here or elsewhere between
Gadamer and Habermas, Habermas clearly owes much to Gadamer.
Habermas received from Gadamer much of his crucial concern for
the use of language to reach genuine understanding and agreement,9s
as opposed to the use of language to assault, alienate, or intimidate.99
9& See HOY & MCCARTHY, supra note 77, at 188; see also, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (John Viertel trans., Polity Press 1988) (1971) ("[I1n every speech
act the telos of reaching an understanding ... is already inherent.").
99. Merely for simplicity of exposition, we will refer mainly to Habermas, but much of the
argument below could be developed through focusing on other writers, including Robert Alexy
and Karl-Otto Apel. See, e.g., Robert Alexy, A Theory of Practical Discourse, in THE
COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 151, 166 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr eds.,
1990) ("Whoever justifies something at least pretends, at least with regard to the justification, to
accept the other person as equal partner in justification and neither to exercise constraint nor to
support constraint exercised by others."); Karl-Otto Apel, Is the Ethics of the Ideal
Communication Community a Utopia? On the Relationship Between Ethics, Utopia, and the
Critique of Utopia, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY, supra, at 23, 43 (asserting
a "pragmatic self-contradiction" to afflict an assertion such as "I hereby assert as true that I am
not obliged in principle to recognize all possible members of the unlimited community of
argumentation as having equal rights"); id. at 55 ("[R]esponsible politics stands.., under the
regulative principle of a long-term strategy of the realization of the formal preconditions for an
ideal community of communication at all levels of human interaction."); id. at 48 (referring to
"the normative preconditions of ideal communication, whose empirical realization in a concrete
society must indeed also be subject to additional preconditions of historical.., concrete
institutions and conventions"); Karl-Otto Apel, Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?: An
Attempt to Answer the Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid Understanding, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER, supra note 64, at 67, 87 ("[T]he solidarity of an
ideal community of communication, which follows the tightly interwoven basic norms of equality
and equal responsibility for the raising and solving of problems in the mutual recognition of the
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Developing Gadamer's work, Habermas believes that "Commu-
nicative freedom exists only between actors who, adopting a
performative attitude, want to reach an understanding with one
another about something and expect one another to take positions on
reciprocally raised validity claims."1c Given the indifference of the
epithet hurler, however, to reaching "an understanding," in any
relevant, serious sense, there is no more reason for Habermas than
for Gadamer to support the idea of including typical epithet speech
within the purpose-based compass of freedom of speech. As with
Gadamer, this conclusion would be founded on reasons separate from
any prior disagreement with, or distaste for, the content of the
epithet.
Habermas recognizes that some forms of verbal behavior can
actually amount to the exercise of social power,10' if not to sheer
domination, 1 2 and to a reflection of social violence. 1 3 Surely much
epithet speech can be thought of precisely in such terms. But
Habermas's approach to speech is much broader and offers broader
insight. As it turns out, his evolving approach to communicative
action may help us more deeply or appropriately assess hate speech,
even if some of the elements of Habermas's approach itself may be
questioned.
Habermas follows J.L. Austin 04 in noticing that in some if not all
cases, the speaker performs an action in speaking.105  While
partners in discourse, has to be presupposed, and even be counterfactually anticipated, as every
serious act of argumentation demonstrates.").
100. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 119.
101. See JORGEN HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 172 (Shierry
Weber Nicholsen & Jerry A. Stark trans., MIT Press 1988) (1970); see also THOMAS
MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS 183 (1981) ("Language is also a
medium of domination and social power.").
102. See HABERMAS, supra note 101, at 172; see also RICOEUR, supra note 90, at 85-86
(referring to the Habermasian conception of "violence in discourse").
103. See JUdRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 314-15 (Jeremy J.
Shapiro trans., Beacon Press 1971) (1968) ("Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical
course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and
recurrently close off the path to unconstrained communication does it further... mankind's
evolution toward autonomy and responsibility.").
104. See supra notes 7, 46.
105. See 1 HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 288-90 (following Austin's distinctions among
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts); 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 62 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1985) (1985) ("With performative
sentences the speaker carries out an action in saying something.") (emphasis omitted). We have
seen that it will often be difficult to classify a particular effect of epithet speech as either
illocutionary or perlocutionary. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Habermas
argues that the strategic pursuit of perlocutionary aims requires deception, or attempted
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"[r]eaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech,"10 6
not all literal speech will remotely fit, or even seek to fit, this
pattern.1 7 Much epithet speech, presumably, will not be aimed at
reaching understanding in a Habermasian sense.
Habermas himself focuses on convicting some speakers of a
performative contradiction. 10 8 To speak is, according to Habermas, to
impliedly issue a series of warranties, 10 9 given what is inescapably
presupposed by ordinary speech.110 The epithet hurler may or may
not be violating any of those implied warranties, thereby ensnaring
deception, regarding the fact that one is acting strategically. See 1 HABERMAS, supra note 6, at
294. This specification does not seem to bear upon the typical case of epithet speech.
106. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 287.
107. See, e.g., id. at 285-86 (distinguishing "strategic" from "communicative" action). We
should note that typical epithet speech is really neither "communicative" nor "strategic." It is
not communicative insofar as it fails to aim at reaching an unimposed understanding in
Habermas's sense, nor is it strategic insofar as epithet speech fails to follow rules of rational
choice aimed at "influencing the decisions of a rational opponent." See id. at 285-87. For
further discussion, see J. Donald Moon, Practical Discourse and Communicative Ethics, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS 143, 146 (Stephen K. White ed., 1995).
108. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 80 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS]. The germ of the idea, intuitively, asks us to think about
someone who orally proclaims their inability to speak, or their unconsciousness, or their severe
laryngitis, or their complete ignorance of language. See also Mark Gould, Law and Philosophy:
Some Consequences for the Law Deriving from the Sociological Reconstruction of Philosophical
Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 1239 (1996); Jirgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1996); Francis J. Mootz III, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary
Legal Scholarship, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 873, 886 n.43 (1994); Pierre Schlag, Law As the
Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 435 (1997) (noting that to deny the
"I" is "to itself reassert the existence of the 'I").
109. Some years ago, for example, Habermas indicated that the apparent consensus-seeking
language game participant impliedly underwrites "the comprehensibility of the utterance, the
truth of its propositional component, the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory
component, and the authenticity of the speaking subject." HABERMAS, supra note 98, at 18; see
also FRED R. DALLMAYR, CRITICAL ENCOUNTERS 80 (1987). More recently, Habermas has
held as among the presuppositions of argumentation that "[e]very subject with the competence
to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse" and that "[e]veryone is allowed to
express his attitudes, desires, and needs." HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note
108, at 89. One could argue, certainly, that virulent racist speech or the use of racial epithets
tends to suppress or silence the expressive speech of its targets. See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL.,
supra note 1; Craig B. Bleifer, Looking at Pornography Through Habermasian Lenses:
Affirmative Action for Speech, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 185 (1996) ("Deafening
speech prevents someone else from speaking or from being heard.").
110. See, e.g., HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 108, at 95. Habermas
believes that such presuppositions, perhaps translatable into norms, are not merely arbitrary,
conventional, or perpetually avoidable. There is simply no realistic alternative to them if a
genuine argumentative conversation is to be undertaken and pursued. See id. at 95, 102. We
should note that Habermas seeks to distinguish, successfully or not, between ordinary
communicative action and what he terms 'discourse,' which features less thoroughgoing initial
agreement. See Solum, supra note 77, at 115. Even if this distinction is tenable and for some
purposes important, it does not seem crucial for the points we make herein.
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himself or herself in some sort of performative contradiction."' But
whether the epithet hurler actually engages in a performative
contradiction is really not crucial for our purposes.
Instead, we might simply ask whether the epithet hurler intends
the sort of speech activity that is logically included under the Free
Speech Clause, given the latter's assumed purposes, again quite apart
from any disagreement with the content of the speaker's message. At
this point, we can call upon Habermas's discussion of ideal or
undistorted communication for illuminating contrast. The point is, of
course, not that free speech is worth protecting only in unrealized,
ideal circumstances. Certainly, we want to protect the speech of more
than just our most enlightened or mature citizens. Rather,
Habermas's description of an unrealized communicative ideal may
again allow us to think more clearly and impartially about what sorts
of speech fall within the proper scope of the Free Speech Clause.112
Habermas refers to "an ideal communication community
encompassing all subjects capable of speech and action.", 3
Importantly for our purposes, "[e]very justified truth claim ... must
ultimately be able to command the rationally motivated agreement of
the community of interpreters as a whole. Here an appeal to some
particular community of interpreters will not suffice." '14  It seems
clear enough that typical instances of epithet speech will be far
removed from such a paradigm. Yet, this is not a matter of our
assessing the baseness, truth, or falsity, in any sense, of any message
logically implied or even vaguely suggested by epithet speech. Our
point is not that claims of group superiority and inferiority, for
example, will likely not prove convincing on the merits to an entire
community, including those disparaged by such a claim. It would
111. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the ideal
speech situation and its presuppositions, see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 212-23 (1976) ("All potential or actual speech presupposes
and anticipates ideal speech, which in turn requires the material conditions ... in which such
speech can be concretely realized."); WILLIAM OUTHWAITE, HABERMAS: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 40 (1994); David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and
Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135, 160-62 (1985); Mootz, supra note 13, at
575-76.
112. For such purposes, we may want to bear in mind one or more of the various possible
purposes or values that might plausibly be thought to underlie the value of free speech in the
first place. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. For a strong and especially interesting
broader claim, see Solum, supra note 77, at 106 ("[Flreedom of speech is best understood as an
attempt to institutionalize the essential conditions of the ideal speech situation.").
113. HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 50.
114. Id. at 53; see also id. at 52 ("Valid statements must admit of justification by appeal to
reasons that could convince anyone irrespective of time or place.").
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defeat the functional logic of free speech to protect or not protect
forms of speech based on how plausible or logically convincing
anyone finds that speech. 115
The point instead goes to the ambitions or intent underlying
typical epithet speech. Any neutral and reasonable observer would
conclude that such epithets ordinarily are not even loosely, indirectly
intended to ever inspire broad, let alone universal, public conviction.
It is not as though epithet hurling is intended even as a mere
contribution to public debate, with the realistic appreciation that the
targets of the invective are unlikely to ratify their own denigration.
Epithet hurling is typically not intended to persuade some
uncommitted middle ground of public opinion or even to reinforce
the views of confirmed racists in the audience. It is typically not
intended to persuade anyone, including the speaker, of anything, to
prepare the way for such persuasion, or to legitimize and reinforce
any set of social beliefs.116 Epithets do not, in any sense, invite
discourse.'17
This claim certainly does not deny that even the bare epithet has
a certain locutionary or other sort of content, if only in the form of an
implied evocation of some sort of racial invidiousness, with all its
possible cultural resonances."8 But the point of the speech, we may
assume, is something like to degrade, to inflict pain and anxiety, and
to indirectly exalt the speaker's group by comparison. The intent is
thus akin to punching or kicking for group-based reasons.1' 9
Doubtless a literal punch or kick can effectively communicate a clear,
specific message. Sometimes, a punch carries an unmistakable
message. But we rightly do not think of, say, a race-based beating as
speech or expression for preliminary free speech purposes, whether
we regulate such "expression" in some fashion or not.120 Habermas
can offer a deeper and more detailed foundation for our thinking in
such fashion.
There is, certainly, nothing question-begging or unfair about
noticing that not all forms of literal speech have identical aspirations
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 26, 33-34 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
120. It is useful to bear in mind the distinction between activity that falls outside the logical
scope of speech itself, for free speech purposes, and speech that falls within that scope, but that
we understandably wish to regulate for some reason. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92 (1982).
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or intended effects. Habermas rightly points out that "in the
symmetry conditions and reciprocity expectations of everyday speech
oriented to reaching understanding, there already exist.., the basic
notions of equal treatment and general welfare on which all morality
turns. ' 121  Similarly, there is no reason to believe that whatever
reasons we may have for protecting freedom of speech must
themselves be, in all respects, politically neutral. Nor would this sort
of neutrality be desirable.
Moral thinking, in turn, requires that "[e]ach of us must be able
to place himself in the situation of all those who would be affected by
the performance of a problematic action or the adoption of a
questionable norm. ' 122 Some epithet speakers may reply that in some
proper, if rather starkly limited sense, they favor equal treatment on
the basis of race. Their epithets may still be appropriately legally
judged. And if some epithet speakers do not propose to respect any
form of equal treatment, it is hardly unfair to notice this fact, as long
as we draw only the proper inferences from such an admission.23
Again, this approach does not promote the notion that a speaker
who rejects some conception of equality, or of how moral principles
must be universalized, should be prohibited from speaking. Certainly
some such speakers will in fact still be promoting our reasons for
protecting free speech, as in the case of current thoughtful debates
over the moral status or equality of various forms of animal life.124
But equally certainly, not all verbal racial abuse can reasonably be
121. HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 50. A bit more elaborately, Habermas argues that
"[gliven the communicative presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive discourse among
free and equal partners, the principle of universalization requires each participant to project
himself into the perspectives of all others." Id. at 52. For discussion of the role of
universalization in morality, see R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND
POINT 20-24 (1981).
122. HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 49. This is of course not to claim that every speaker who
does not aspire to some sort of impartial, universalist morality falls outside the scope of the
purposes and coverage of the Free Speech Clause. For further discussion, see HOY &
MCCARTHY, supra note 77, at 55 ("[A]s Habermas conceives of it, practical discourse demands
of participants that they take into consideration the needs and interests of all who will be
affected by the outcome of their deliberations.").
123. At the level of broad principle, see Otfried Hbffe, Kantian Skepticism Toward
Transcendental Ethics of Communication, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY,
supra note 99, at 193, 218 ("[lIt is the task of the legal order to make possible institutionally
discursive will-formation in the framework of the communicative process."). Habermas thus
recognizes a moral requirement in the "transformation of the material conditions that block and
distort communication." BERNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 190.
124. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 110-34 (2d ed. 1993).
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said to cohere as well with our reasons for protecting free speech in
the first place.1 5
CONCLUSION
We have herein focused mainly on some congruences between
Gadamer and Habermas, as opposed to their perhaps occasionally
overdrawn or overemphasized points of contention. Neither
Gadamer nor Habermas offers a template for resolving constitutional
free speech cases in general, or any sort of hate speech case in
particular. What they jointly offer of primary importance for us,
though, is a deep, thorough, and sensitive account of social
conversation that suggests why restricting hate speech does not
amount simply to censoring an unattractive view of the world. They
help us, instead, to more incisively appreciate how all forms of literal
speech are not created equal, and why we can make reasonable
progress in sorting out literal speech that generally tends to promote
the values underlying freedom of speech from literal speech that does
not, without betraying those values in the process.
125. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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